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Abstract
We surveyed members of the adaptation community about their views on high-end
climate change—here defined as global average temperature increase exceeding 2 °C at
the end of the century—at consecutive conferences in 2016 and 2018. Most strikingly our
surveys show that a majority of the community disagrees that the Paris Agreement has
reduced the possibility of the world reaching dangerous levels of climate change.
Consistent with this, around two thirds of people consulted are considering high-end
climate change or using high-end scenarios in their work all the time, or starting to.
However, this is still not done by all. Preparedness for the specific threats posed by high-
end impacts is not keeping pace, and more work needs to be done to strengthen the
research basis and understand adaptation needs under high-end climate change. More-
over, views on finding information on impacts and tools for decision-making have not
changed between 2016 and 2018, showing that there is no improvement. This situation
underlines that the adaptation community needs to do better in supporting exchange of
information and data between all actors—in addition to finding and filling knowledge
gaps. Despite this, there is widespread support for avoiding delaying large-scale adapta-
tion until we have more certainty.
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1 Introduction
The Paris Agreement and current emissions trajectories are at odds with each other. Whilst the
Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2015) sets out a target to limit the increase in global mean
temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels along with the pursuit of efforts
to limit the increase to 1.5 °C, current emissions trajectories, as for example implied by the
Nationally Determined Contributions, point to increased temperatures between 2.6 and 3.1 °C
(Rogelj et al. 2016) by 2100, with warming continuing afterwards (UNEP 2018). Already
today average global temperatures have risen ~ 1 °C compared to pre-industrial times and
warming is projected to reach 1.5 °C within two to three decades (IPCC 2018 p. 6).
Although global CO2 emissions flattened out between 2014 and 2016, they increased by
1.6% in 2017 and 1.7% in 2018 (IEA 2019). This development is mainly driven by higher
economic growth and slower declines in energy, and especially carbon, intensity compared with
2014–2016 (UNEP 2018: pp. 5–6). However, there is considerable uncertainty as to whether
the 2014–2016 slowdownwas driven primarily by short-term economic factors (Ibid.). Short of
a global economic downturn, global CO2 emissions are likely to continue rising in 2019
(Jackson et al. 2018). It is clear that the world has a long way to go before greenhouse gas
concentrations are stabilised at levels that would prevent potentially dangerous climate change.
High-end climate change (HECC), defined as global average temperature increase beyond 2 °C
with possible increases of 4 °C or more in the long-term, is becoming increasingly plausible.
Relative to lower levels of climate change, HECCmay imply increasing climate variability and
extremes, crossing thresholds and therefore profound changes to the environment that are very
difficult to project. The IPCC Special Report on global warming of 1.5 °C (IPCC 2018) shows
considerable differences in impacts between 1.5 and 2 °C global temperature increase, which
suggests that it is important to focus on further comparisons among scenarios, including those at
the higher end. Existing literature, reviewed in the next section of this paper, points to much more
severe consequences beyond 2 °C, and it is therefore important to raise questions regarding how
well-informed members of the ‘adaptation community’ feel about potential challenges of HECC.
This paper presents results from two identical surveys sent out to participants at two
consecutive international conferences on climate change adaptation, Adaptation Futures
20161 (259 responses) and 20182 (198 responses) (see Appendix Table 1). There is a vast
literature on surveying climate change opinions, both public and expert (Hamilton 2018;
Tàbara et al. 2012). Marquart-Pyatt et al. (2015) describe techniques for integrating climate
data into sociological analysis, using spatial (cross-sectoral) and/or temporal (time series)
variation. Tàbara et al. (2012) show that social science research on public perceptions of
global warming has embraced an increasing number of topics and questions and identified a
widening range of influencing factors. They also review annual surveys of the general public
(1000 people in each of 24 countries), showing that concern for climate change is growing
worldwide. Our sample is small compared to such large-scale public surveys, but is substantial
for a relatively specialised field. To our knowledge, these are the largest surveys of their kind
1 http://www.adaptationfutures2016.org/results/introduction
2 https://adaptationfutures2018.capetown
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assessing the climate change adaptation community’s preparedness for climate change beyond
the Paris Agreement.
Section 2 reviews the literature on impacts beyond 2 °C, perceptions on HECC and societal
and political responses to the risks. Section 3 presents the methods and materials employed.
Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 discusses the significance of the results and Section 6
concludes.
2 Background on high-end climate change
2.1 Considering the impacts of HECC
Although recent research on impacts beyond 2 °C is relatively sparse, the existing
literature points to much more severe consequences compared to the historical period,3
such as those described for flood risk (Alfieri et al. 2015), sea-level rise (Golledge
et al. 2015; Cooper and Lemckert 2012), water scarcity (Schewe et al. 2014) and heat
stress (Sherwood and Huber 2010) and on sectors including agriculture (crops—
Ostberg et al. 2018, Parkes et al. 2018, agricultural welfare—Stevanović et al.
2016), freshwater (Koutroulis et al. 2018) and groundwater (Portmann et al. 2013).
The IPCC AR5 (Oppenheimer et al. 2014) includes a section on risks from > 4 °C
above pre-industrial levels, claiming that the evidence base has only recently become
sufficient to allow for assessment. Relevant climate scenarios include those based on
RCP 8.5,4 which in 2081–2100 is projected to result in a temperature rise of 4.3 °C ±
0.7 °C with temperature above 4 °C as likely as not5 (Collins et al. 2013, p. 1056).
HECC scenarios, impacts, responses and solutions were the focus of three comple-
mentary European Union (EU) projects assessing impacts and adaptation across a
range of land, water and coastal ecosystems: HELIX (High-End cLimate Impacts and
eXtreme); IMPRESSIONS (IMPacts and REsponses from high-end Scenarios: Strate-
gies for Innovative SolutiONS) and RISES-AM (Responses to coastal climate change:
Innovative Strategies for high-End Scenarios–Adaptation and Mitigation). Berry et al.
(2017) bring together key findings from these three projects. Regional integrated
assessment modelling was used to compare impacts of low-end (< 2 °C) and high-
end (> 4 °C) climate change scenarios for Europe (Harrison et al. 2019b). The authors
found that many indicators showed impacts are much greater under HECC in the
2050s and 2080s.
Furthermore, HECC might lead to non-linear and irreversible effects (Steffen et al.
2018) and more severe systemic effects due to cross-sectoral interactions (Harrison
et al. 2016) and transnational impacts (Hedlund et al. 2018). Finally, HECC might
push ecosystems and societies beyond their limits of adaptation (Dow et al. 2013;
Klein et al. 2015) resulting in loss and damage (James et al. 2014).
3 Projections are often compared with a historical reference period. However, there is a degree of discrepancy, for
instance the IPCC AR5 uses 1976–2005 and 1850–1900 as historical baselines.
4 RCPs, or representative concentration pathways, specify a level of radiative forcing—net energy radiation in
W/m2. RCPs contain information on future levels of greenhouse gases, aerosols and land cover. RCP 8.5 exceeds
8.5 W/m2 by 2100.
5 Indicating that this outcome has an assessed likelihood of 33–66%
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2.2 Perceptions around HECC
The body of research on perceptions and work practices related to HECC is limited. The IPCC
AR5 discussed perceptions of climate change risks and its influence on adaptive
capacities and thus vulnerability (Oppenheimer et al. 2014: pp.1050) but not relating
specifically to HECC.
Capela Lourenço et al. (2019) found that decision-makers perceived HECC scenarios as
neither more likely nor urgent nor useful than lower end scenarios, but that they considered
them useful for anticipating the implementation of adaptation action. Similarly, in an interview
study in the land resources context in Scotland, Dunn et al. (2017) found that decision-makers
generally perceive HECC as having low probability of occurrence. Capela Lourenço et al.’s
study (2019), which included three countries and the European level, showed that whilst the
uptake of information on HECC did occur, its influence on decisions was very variable and
case study contingent.
Finally, terminology might be a barrier to a better understanding of HECC. Within
the research community, there is still no universally agreed definition of ‘high-end
climate change’. The three EU funded studies mentioned above (Berry et al. 2017)
consider high-end scenarios in which global average warming exceeds 2 °C in 2100
with respect to pre-industrial levels. However, Capela Lourenço et al. (2014) suggest
that high-end scenarios are more usually defined in the range exceeding 4 °C, and this
is also the case with some of the EU research (e.g. Harrison et al. 2019a). The Fifth
Assessment report of the IPCC (Collins et al. 2013, p. 1055) shows that higher-end
RCPs generate global average temperatures that vary quite widely (multimodel mean
± 1 standard deviation range of 3.7 ± 0.7 for RCP 8.5 and 2.2 ± 0.5 for RCP 6). Thus,
the mapping between the starting point of modelling and the projected impacts is
complex. Within climate change impacts research, a precise definition of HECC is
likely to remain elusive. This could also be significant for how the issue is perceived
in policy and practice.
2.3 Response to HECC risk
The potentially more severe consequences associated with HECC will require new risk
management approaches, as conventional strategies and solutions may not be enough.
Extreme sea-level rise (SLR) is the area that has probably been considered the most.
Cooper and Lemckert (2012) explored SLR of + 1, + 2 and + 5 m by 2100 and
adaptation options for resort cities on the Gold Coast, Australia. They conclude that
pre-planned adaptation would probably enable the city to survive SLR of 1 m, whilst
an unplanned response would have marginal chances of success. For a 2 m SLR, they
contend that even with an adaptation plan in place, the scale of measures required
would severely stretch the city’s resources. Under a 5 m SLR, they believe that no
amount of planning would enable the city to survive as a coastal resort. Reeder and
Ranger (2011) addressed SLR and flooding in the Thames Estuary in the UK, finding
that it would become difficult to protect London at 5 m.
Environmental or forced migration is a further area that has been studied in some depth as
an adaptation response to severe climate change risk (Piguet 2010; Hamza et al. 2010). For
example, the HELIX project included case studies of migration to abrupt drying (Longueville
et al. 2015) or to accelerated SLR and related changes (Zickgraf 2015) in the focal region of
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West Africa. Both studies found that migration dynamics have shifted towards migration for
longer periods or over greater distances, although affecting different groups of people
differently. It is also thought that further changes could exacerbate the vulnerability
beyond the limits of adaptation and lead to ‘distress migration’ as a strategy of last
resort.
Potential responses in the agriculture sector have also been investigated. Parkes
et al. (2018) consider how maize yields and crop failure rates are influenced by
surface warming levels of 2 °C and 4 °C, using RCP 8.5 scenarios. They examined
the efficacy of adaptation methods to mitigate the effects, finding that crops grown
with runoff capture water show a smaller change in yields than crops adapted to high
temperature stress. Beyond these specific HECC risks, there are more studies consid-
ering systemic risks and solutions. Within the complementary EU projects, results
underline that HECC together with socio-economic changes most likely will require
transformative solutions. That is, solutions are needed that change economic and
social systems and tackle the underlying causes of vulnerability and unsustainability.
Transformative (sometimes termed transformational) adaptation (Kates et al. 2012;
Lonsdale et al. 2015; Tàbara et al. 2019) has emerged as counterpoint to incremental
adaptation, sometimes seen as insufficient to tackle climate change. Transformative
adaptation focuses on more radical or disruptive change and long-term adaptation
often requiring a change in the objectives and/or functioning of the system to be
adapted. It involves addressing root causes and connections among a range of
interconnected forces through reinvention and innovation across more than one system
(Lonsdale et al. 2015). Criteria include that actions are adopted at a much larger scale,
are new to a particular region or resource system, or involve the shifting of such
systems to other locations (Kates et al. 2012). A transformative agenda or paradigm
(Hermwille 2016) might be a suitable response to risks associated with HECC. One
aim of proposed ‘Transformative Climate Science’ (Tàbara et al. 2019) is to under-
stand and support agents’ transformative capacities. Hölscher et al. (2019) provide a
conceptual framework of capacities for transformative climate governance which
enables climate mitigation and adaptation whilst purposefully steering societies to-
wards low-carbon, resilient and sustainable objectives. Frantzeskaki et al. (2019)
present a methodology that combines transition management and high-end climate
and socio-economic change scenarios to identify sustainability pathways for Europe.
A very different school of thought is the ‘wait and see’ approach to climate action.
This is the argument that we should wait with taking decisions until more information
is available, and uncertainty about climate impacts (and the benefits of adaptation) is
reduced. ‘Wait and see’ as a climate policy approach has long been associated with
the United States (US) administration. It is also recognised in climate change adap-
tation research6; for example Berkhout et al. (2006) identified it as a relevant
organisational strategy, and Jones and Preston (2011) as a form of adaptation risk
management. Several authors express concerns about inaction, however. Recently
Magnan et al. (2016) designated the ‘wait and see’ approach as maladaptation, since
it actively failed to address known vulnerability.
6 The economic rationale is that ‘wait and see’ can avoid the potential waste of resources and lock-in to
irreversible investments.
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3 Method and material
3.1 Survey development and distribution
Our research centred on perceptions and work practices relating to HECC. Research confer-
ences present a good opportunity for collecting views on a topic such as this, serving as forums
to help generate and evaluate certain hypotheses; yet as such they seem underused. If sufficient
responses can be obtained, these may arguably represent the views of a specific professional
community as a whole. Our focus is on the international community of decision-makers,
practitioners and researchers working on climate change adaptation. Given the broad appeal of
the conference and the choice of method—i.e. we think surveys are more representative than
other approaches such as expert interviews, panel discussions or case studies—we hope to
capture general views of the community as a whole, although we also discuss some of the
limitations below.
The conference surveys collected participant personal attributes as well as perceptions and
practices around HECC and usage of climate change platforms7 (see Appendix Table 1).8 The
surveys were administered at two consecutive international conferences from the Adaptation
Futures series, co-hosted by the World Adaptation Science Programme. Since 2010, the
conference has been held every 2 years, and was held in Rotterdam, Netherlands, in 2016
and in Cape Town, South Africa, in 2018, when the surveys were carried out. The conference
has become the biggest and most important venue for the international community of
adaptation researchers, and its two most recent meetings registered a total of 3000 attendees.9
The seven statements used in the HECC surveys were:
1. ‘The likelihood of high-end climate change now becoming reality has decreased after the
Paris agreement’
2. ‘It is easy to find information about potential impacts of high-end climate change’
3. ‘It is easy to find information about decision making with respect to impacts, adaptation
and vulnerability in the context of high-end climate change’
4. ‘We, as a society, have tools in place to deal with impacts from high-end climate change’
5. ‘In my work I am considering climate changes of more than 2 degrees C’
6. ‘I am using high end climate change scenarios for decision-making processes in the
context of adaptation/mitigation’
7. ‘We should wait with large-scale adaptation activities until we have more certainty about
the impacts of high-end climate change’
The same set of statements were used in both years, so that we could identify significant shifts
in opinion. Using respondent attribute information, we were also able to consider occupational
and regional differences. Data were collected shortly after the conference—however with the
event being held shortly before the summer holiday period (May or June), we sent reminder
emails in September in order to maximise the number of responses. We used SurveyMonkey to
administer and collect the data and R statistical software (R Core Team 2019) to carry out
7 Platforms included those available online only, plus online platforms that included other forms of knowledge
brokering.
8 The survey reported here was part of a larger survey also including questions about the conference in general.
All delegates who registered received the link to the survey by email from the organisers.
9 Approximately 1700 in Rotterdam and 1300 in Cape Town.
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analyses. The HECC part of the survey collected only ‘categorical’ data; some questions used
a standard 5-point Likert scale and some of them non-Likert ordinal data. A dataset with results
from both years is available (Taylor et al. 2020).
3.2 Survey response analysis
There were 259 and 198 responses to the 2016 and 2018 surveys, respectively. A majority of
2016 delegates were based in Europe whereas in 2018 a majority were based in Africa. In both
years, a majority of respondents were scientists/researchers but there was also a large sample
from government sectors (see Appendix Fig. 4).
We compared HECC survey responses 2016 vs. 2018, and we compared responses by
location and by occupation. We also conducted significance tests for differences among
response categories. We chose two non-parametric tests that are appropriate here. The chi-
square test finds the probability (p) of the distribution of answers to a question remaining the
same in 2018 as it was in 2016. This assumes the data is categorical with no repeat answers, so
we assume those answering the survey are not the same people in 2016 as in 2018. This seems
reasonable because a large majority of the participants said they had not been to any previous
Adaptation Futures conferences (80% in 2018 and 85% in 2016). The Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney (WMW) test tests whether there has been a general shift in opinion rather than a
change in the proportions of responses within categories. For both tests, we conclude that there
is a significant difference between comparison groups if the p value is less than 0.05.
For comparison tests between those based in different geographical regions and working in
different occupational roles, we first considered if the number of responses for each category
are sufficient for indicative comparison. We investigated statistical differences for: HECC
2018 questions by Location, Africa vs. Other; 2016 HECC questions by Location, Europe vs.
Other; combined 2016/2018 data differences between Europe and Africa. In the latter case, we
combined data from both surveys on questions where we observed similarity of the responses.
This was deemed a valid way to obtain a population with sample size suitable for comparing
Africa and Europe for these questions.
Various occupational categories were included (see Appendix Table 1). For the analyses
reported in Section 4, we re-categorised the raw data to obtain fewer categories with larger
numbers of observations. Respondents belonging to entities ‘Government’, ‘Government
agency’ and ‘Public policy’ were re-categorised as ‘Gov Related’ and are compared to those
belonging to the ‘Research organization’ category.10 The main results are presented graphi-
cally in ‘Likert-plots’ (stacked bar charts) for ease of comparison of ordinal data across the two
surveys and location and occupation. Statistical test results are also noted (see Appendix
Table 2 for full results).
3.3 Limitations
We list four main limitations of the methodology presented above:
First, our sample includes only those participating at conferences. A majority of participants
were scientists/researchers and from government; fewer of them represented the other roles or
sectors that carry out much of the practical adaptation-related decision-making (e.g. civil
10 In 2016, “Gov Related” was the second largest category. However in 2018, “NGO” was second largest (i.e.
larger than “Gov Related”—see Appendix Fig. 4b).
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society, NGOs and consultants). On the other hand, some academics have multiple roles, and
may well be familiar with the issues.
A second limitation is the lack of a balanced representation of global regions. It is evident
that a conference in Europe will attract more Europeans, a conference in Africa will attract
more people from that continent; representation of other regions is much lower and therefore
we expect results to be affected and views not captured. As previously mentioned, we collected
information on where people said they were based and have to some extent analysed these
differences.
A third possible limitation is that HECC is still a relatively new term and for many people
could be confusing. For those with high technical expertise our use of the term could be
confusing because it hides key information about > 2 °C scenarios, their underlying assump-
tions and the outcomes they portray. Our survey may be found to be imprecise and confusing.
For others, different terms might be used more. For example, following the Paris Agreement, it
is quite common to refer to ‘dangerous climate change’ but this is also problematic because it
ultimately involves judgements about acceptable risks.
Finally, despite our effort to define terms and use a precise language, one major problem
with internet surveys is that people might interpret the questions—and answer categories—
very differently. This is in contrast to face-to-face or telephone interviews, where it is possible
to ask for clarification for instance. This is a particular problem with interdisciplinary
communities that work with very different types of knowledge and know-how such as is the
case with climate change adaptation.
4 Results
We first discuss results that consider the international climate governance system response to
the climate’s signal (i.e. high emissions despite Paris) (statement 1). We then cover results
about the information and tools availability for HECC (statements number 2, 3 and 4). Finally,
we discuss what respondents say about what is actually happening in practice in terms of their
use of scenarios and views about adaptation actions (statements 5, 6 and 7). However, we add
the caveat that these results are based on sampling that is not totally representative having
several methodological limitations (see 3.3).
4.1 Can the Paris Agreement prevent dangerous climate change?
We asked whether participants agreed with the statement ‘The likelihood of high-end climate
change now becoming reality has decreased after the Paris agreement’.
Results show that in 2018, compared with 2016, people consider it less likely that HECC
can be avoided. We see significant overall opinion shift with the number disagreeing or
strongly disagreeing that the likelihood of HECC has been reduced after Paris (reaching
60% of responses in 2018, up from 42% in 2016) (Fig. 1a; χ2: p = 1.049e−04, WMW: p =
2.047e−04). The proportion of people responding neutrally that they ‘Neither agree nor
disagree’ also reduces greatly.
We then compared governmental and researcher participant perceptions about the impact of
the Paris Agreement on the likelihood of avoidance of dangerous levels of climate change
(Fig. 1b). Interestingly the results from 2016 show that the research community was signif-
icantly more sceptical than the government (χ2: p = 0.0205, WMW: p = 0.0046). In
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2016, 46% of researchers and 32% of government professionals disagreed or strongly
disagreed (Fig. 1b). In 2018, however, the difference between the two occupational
groups on this question was not statistically significant (in fact, in all 2018 questions,
there was no evidence that respondents from Governmental and research organisations
answered differently). On this particular question about the Paris Agreement in 2018, the
overall response was more negative (Fig. 1a) showing the same direction of shift as the
researcher response in 2016.
In a final step, we investigated whether there were differences of opinion by location,
selecting the most well-represented regions in 2018’s survey: Africa, Europe, North America
and Asia. We ignored those regions where there were too few responses to give a good
indication of opinion (Central and South America, Small Islands, Australasia, Polar regions).
Using 2018 data, we found that Europe and North America both had a very similar level of
disagreement, of around 72%, and Asia and Africa had a corresponding figure of around 50–
52% (Fig. 1c). Thus, there appear to be some geographical differences of opinion as well as
8% 33% 19% 6%





0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
a
2% 30% 27% 10%













Europe North America Asia Africa
c
Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree nor disagree Agree Strongly agree
Fig. 1 A comparison of responses to the question about the Paris Agreement a for 2016 and 2018, b for
researcher and government participants in 2016 and c percentage of disagree and strongly disagree responses by
location of participants in 2016
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occupational ones. However, it should be noted that there were insufficient numbers of
responses to test significance in this case. Combining categories, we conducted some tests
to compare Europe vs. ‘Other regions’ in 2016 and Africa vs. ‘Other regions’ in 2018 but the
differences were found to be quite minor. Also, because of the shift in opinion on this question,
we were not able to combine the datasets from 2016 and 2018 to give a sufficient number of
responses to test Europe vs Africa.
4.2 Information on impacts and tools for decision-making under high-end climate
change
We enquired about the information and tools availability for HECC through statements 2–4. A
striking result was comparative stability of responses between 2016 and 2018 overall (Fig. 2).
First, we asked whether participants agreed with the statement ‘It is easy to find information
about potential impacts of high-end climate change’. Compared to 2016, in 2018, more people
disagreed (30%) with this statement (Fig. 2a), although there was no statistically significant
change (χ2: p = 0.081, WMW: p = 0.4033). In 2018, only 8% of respondents reported finding
this ‘Very easy’; therefore, it is clear that there is a lot of room for improvement in this area.
We also asked whether participants agreed with the statement ‘It is easy to find information
about decision making with respect to impacts, adaptation and vulnerability in the context of
high-end climate change’. Around half (46–50%) of respondents found it difficult or very
difficult to find information about decision-making in the context of HECC (Fig. 2b). In both
surveys, the most common response to the question was ‘Difficult’ and the least common
response was ‘Very easy’. Whilst there was no evidence of an opinion shift overall (WMW:
p = 0.8217), there was a significant change in response (χ2: p = 0.0464) with fewer people
selecting ‘Neither easy nor difficult’ in 2018. These findings suggest that there was no
improvement—no progress at all—on ease of finding information either about impacts or
about decision-making under HECC.
Finally, we asked participants whether they agreed with the statement ‘We, as a society,
have tools in place to deal with impacts from high-end climate change’. There were mixed
responses to this question across both surveys (Fig. 2c). Compared to 2016, in 2018, fewer
people said they agreed; more said they strongly disagreed. However, there were no statisti-
cally significant results (χ2: p = 0.4564, WMW: p = 0.3055). We also found that in 2016,
government-related participants were significantly more in agreement with the statement
compared to researchers (χ2: p = 0.0241, WMW: p = 0.0012). Overall this question—
although in many ways similar to the previous one—revealed more positive responses towards
‘tools’ than ‘information about decision making’. It may suggest that—despite confidence in
the availability of suitable tools—accessing decision-relevant information generated by them is
a greater challenge.
4.3 Actions on high-end climate change
We looked into what is actually happening on high-end climate change within the climate
adaptation community by including statements 5–7.
First we asked whether people agreed with the statement ‘In my work I am considering
climate changes of more than 2 degrees C’. We find little change between 2016 and 2018 in
extent to which people say they are considering HECC in their work. Around 63–65% are
considering HECC in their work all the time, or starting to. There was slightly lower use in
74 Climatic Change (2020) 161:65–87
2018 (Fig. 3a) but not significantly lower when tested (χ2: p = 0.0902, WMW: p = 0.1332). A
small group of people in both surveys said they were not considering HECC. The strong
majority for considering HECC seems to be consistent with the earlier finding that people do
not think that the likelihood of high-end climate change has decreased with the Paris
Agreement.
Due to the similarity of the responses in 2016 and 2018 in the consideration of HECC, we
combine results from both years to investigate this same question by location. We find that
participants based in Africa consider HECC significantly less frequently overall than those in
Europe (Fig. 3b; χ2: p = 0.0118, WMW: p = 0.0062). Whereas in Europe around 67% of
people are considering HECC in their work all the time, or starting to, in Africa this figure is
6% 21% 31% 4%





0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
a
11% 39% 12% 1%





0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
b
12% 28% 33% 6%





0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
c
Very difficult Difficult Neither easy nor difficult Easy Very easy
Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree nor disagree Agree Strongly agree
Fig. 2 A comparison of responses in 2016 and 2018 on a the ease of finding information about potential impacts
of HECC, b the ease of finding information about decision-making in the context of HECC and c level of
agreement with the statement about having tools in place to deal with impacts of HECC
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around 57%. Those considering HECC ‘Not at all’ numbered 14% in Africa and 8% in
Europe.
Second, we asked whether people agreed with the statement ‘I am using high end climate
change scenarios for decision-making processes in the context of adaptation/mitigation’.
Fifty-four to 55% of respondents said they were using high-end climate change scenarios
for decision-making processes ‘all the time’ or were starting to, with a share of around 20%
saying that they were using them ‘not at all’. The responses were quite invariable between the
2016 and 2018 surveys (Fig. 3c) showing no significant differences (χ2: p = 0.247, WMW:
p = 0.4755).
Our final question concerns perceptions for how society should deal with impacts of
HECC. We asked whether people agreed with the statement ‘We should wait with large-
9% 27% 19% 46%
14% 23% 25% 38%
2016
2018
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
a
14% 28% 28% 29%
8% 25% 18% 49%
Africa
Europe
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
b
20% 26% 29% 25%
20% 25% 22% 33%
2016
2018
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
c
27% 52% 10%1%





0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
d
Not at all Occasionally We are starting to All the time
Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree nor disagree Agree Strongly agree
Fig. 3 a A comparison of responses in 2016 and 2018 about whether people consider more than 2 °C in their
work, b comparing the extent to which people based in Europe and Africa consider HECC in their work, c
comparing responses in 2016 and 2018 about whether people consider HECC scenarios in decision-making and
d comparing responses in 2016 and 2018 about waiting with large-scale adaptation activities until we have more
certainty
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scale adaptation activities until we have more certainty about the impacts of high-end climate
change’. Results show a strong majority for not waiting for more certain information (Fig. 3d).
This sits at around 80% (disagreement or strong disagreement with the statement) in both
surveys. However, people disagree more strongly in 2018 than they did in 2016. There was a
significant shift in opinion (χ2: p = 3.096e−05, WMW: p = 0.001). In 2018, 49% of people
strongly disagreed. A minority of around 11% agrees or strongly agrees with waiting, and a
minority selected the neutral response. However, the majority verdict is quite clear: this rejects
the ‘Wait and see’ approach and recommends immediate action on large-scale adaptation
activities in response to the risks of HECC.
4.4 Usage of climate change knowledge platforms
We included a supplementary question to measure participants’ use of platforms for climate
change information in general: ‘Which of the following knowledge platforms do you use in
your work?’ (Appendix Table 1). Results are included in our supplementary material
(ESM). For the 2018 survey we identified 25 platforms through a review of the landscape,
including global, regional and community knowledge platforms with online presence (but
excluding institutional websites), noting that some of them may not reach beyond a 'niche' of
users. Findings revealed low usage of platforms overall. Half of the platforms had never been
used by at least 75% of those responding to the survey. Seven of the platforms had been used
by at least 50% of respondents; however, most of these users said they were occasional users; a
minority described themselves as frequent users. Low use suggests that platforms are not
currently as effective in communicating climate information to adaptation professionals as
might be desired.
5 Discussion
5.1 Understanding participants’ scepticism towards the Paris Agreement
Results reflect a perceived lack of progress on climate goals, in the post-Paris Agreement era.
The surveys took place at a time when the legal and scientific ramifications of the Paris
Agreement were coming under closer scrutiny and increasing political pressure. The 2016
conference was post-Paris, but before the Trump administration announced that the US would
be withdrawing from the agreement, an action that may have had some impact on perceptions.11
Meanwhile, the science has focused on 1.5 °C. When the 2018 conference took place, the draft
summary of the 1.5 °C report was available but the Paris Rulebook, the compilation of the rules
and guidelines needed to put the 2015 Paris Agreement into practice, was not yet agreed.
Our result shows that overall opinion can shift quite rapidly on key provisions of the
climate governance system. It highlights the fact that confidence and trust in the process is
precarious. Many commentators have criticised the Agreement for the lack of a legally binding
obligation (e.g. Bawden 2016; Sharma 2017), lack of provision for climate financing and its
effectiveness (e.g. Müller 2016; Sharma 2017), for lack of clarity on ‘loss and damage’ (e.g.
11 Since the June 1, 2017 announcement, the US State Department have continued to attend negotiations whilst
the country remains in the agreement. Meanwhile, US companies, cities and states have vowed to continue to cut
emissions.
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Sharma 2017), for transparency and comparability of its NDC mechanisms (e.g. Pauw et al. 2018)
and for the ‘emissions gap’ not addressed (e.g. Victor et al. 2017; UNEP 2018). Yet the Paris
Agreement was important for raising the profile of adaptation. Research priorities have also shifted.
It has been suggested that adaptation research has entered a fourth generation, focused on imple-
mentation questions, whilst continuing to build on past areas of inquiry (understanding climate
change impacts, defining adaptation’s core concepts and interactions and adaptation policy and
financing mechanisms) (Klein et al. 2017; Dzebo and Stripple 2015).
Why did researchers have more pessimistic views on the Paris Agreement than
government-related participants in the 2016 survey (Fig. 1b)? A conventional explanation is
that researchers are trained in different ways to government employees/civil service which
might lead them to question such a proposition more critically. On the other hand, it is obvious
that the sectors are linked to different sources of information, and they process information
through different filters. Scientific and political processes around climate change develop at
different rates, but there are many ways in which they affect one another. For instance, research
findings can contribute to pressure on governments to revisit their pledges and actions and
make them more transparent and accountable, realigning them with what is actually happen-
ing, which also would provide a further important role for researchers (Victor et al. 2017).
Interestingly in 2018, the scientific and government representatives surveyed were equally
sceptical about the Paris Agreement.
5.2 Reviewing information provision and decision relevance
One of the most important questions concerns how well-informed participants feel about
HECC and its potential challenges, which imply ‘preparing for higher levels of adaptation
than we hope are necessary’ (Capela Lourenço et al. 2019). With statement 3, we aimed to
understand respondents’ views on the quality of information for decision-making, considering
that not all information about potential impacts under HECC might be directly relevant. The
fact that around half of respondents (see Fig. 2b) found it difficult or very difficult to find
information about decision-making in the context of HECC is therefore worrying. ‘Decision-
first’ approaches to adaptation have become more important as climate information needs have
changed (Watkiss 2015). However, it is also claimed that decision-making under HECC does
not imply an extrapolation of decision-making under moderate climate change (Stafford-Smith
et al. 2010). For higher levels of adaptation, information about conventional strategies and
solutions used in adaptation decision-making is not particularly useful. Thus, one gap is
information sources for identifying and comparing long-term interventions that might be
needed under HECC.
Around a third of participants said they have difficulty finding information about potential
impacts, but a similar number thought the opposite. These differences suggest that information
might not be available in a consistent way across different levels of action, sectors and
disciplines. However, comparisons based on participant location or occupation show no
differences. Detecting patterns in information access merits further investigation. The overall
lack of improvement in responses to statements 2–4 are disappointing and underline that the
adaptation community needs to better support exchange of information and data between all
actors, and to conduct new research to address knowledge gaps. Using more sophisticated,
integrated scenarios that include other types of knowledge, providing decision-relevant knowl-
edge specific to HECC, and considering policy responses that include large-scale adaptations
will be necessary.
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At present, there is very little research about communication of HECC information
specifically. According to Tàbara et al. (2017) ‘a major difficulty in the assessment and
communication of HECC is dealing with potential system discontinuities, abrupt changes
and tipping points and their implications for policy’. Our surveys confirm that provision of
HECC information is challenging but do not provide insight into why this is the case. Partial
answers can be found from smaller, qualitative surveys about limitations to the use of climate
change information. Tàbara et al. (2017) found that Spanish knowledge contributors found
little actionable use for IPCC information: it was overly complicated, not specified at the local
level and not sufficiently oriented towards solutions. Similarly, Capela Lourenço et al.
(2019) reported that information is not usable because (i) it is not adequately tailored
to the decision-making circumstances (e.g. variables, spatial and timescales), (ii) there
is a lack of cross-sectoral information and it is often not presented in a format that is
usable (or translated out of ‘researcher language’), and (iii) some barriers on the usage
of data formats still remain. HECC information—characterised by an unclear termi-
nology, scarce evidence, high uncertainty and potentially profound changes and
interactions—may be particularly complicated. To the three reasons above, we add a
fourth: (iv) HECC information does not adequately integrate socio-economic factors
that determine future vulnerabilities and adaptive capacities (as well as human pres-
sures on the climate system) into assessments of scenarios.
Arguably, information and tools are becoming increasingly available e.g. through ‘knowl-
edge brokers’ but remain very difficult to find. Hammill et al. (2013) observed that the climate
change information landscape is very fragmented and confusing. There is information over-
load and the sector is overcrowded with different platforms and products. The landscape is also
changing fast, and moving from a supply-driven to a climate service-driven production system
that takes greater account of participants needs (Capela Lourenço et al. 2016). Climate services
are focused on the need for user-centred products and the format of delivery. In this context, it
is revealing that participants make scant use of knowledge brokering platforms’ services. It
suggests that platforms are not currently as effective in communicating climate information to
adaptation professionals as might be desired.
The relatively high number of responses to our surveys suggests that the term ‘high-end
climate change’ is meaningful for many in the adaptation community. However, it joins the
already crowded field of climate change jargon. In our opinion, it is important to define it more
carefully and consistently in relation to other terms like ‘dangerous climate change’ and more
precisely in relation to the use of scenarios in order to avoid confusion.
5.3 Considering action on high-end climate change
Results show that around two thirds of people consulted are considering HECC or using high-
end scenarios in their work all the time, or starting to (Fig. 3). However, this is still not done as
a matter of course by all. In addition, we recognise that to ‘consider HECC’ could mean
different things to different people. It is also possible that some users of climate data do not
actually know whether the scenarios they are using exceed 2 °C or not—particularly given that
they are not easily labelled by global averages nor by the term ‘high-end climate change’.
Responses to statements 5 and 6 show that more people are considering HECC whilst not
necessarily building this into decision processes, which suggests it is being used in a more
conceptual manner. This ties in with the result that around 20% are ‘starting to’ consider
HECC and around 25% are ‘starting to’ consider scenarios in decision-making.
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It also suggests decisions are relatively ‘insensitive’ to specific levels of global temperature
change and tend to focus more on the impacts and consequences at their respective scales or
institutional interests (Capela Lourenço et al. 2019). Many institutions may not currently be
considering changes above 1.5–2 °C because the IPCC (2018) has focused on the high
ambition outcome of the Paris Agreement whilst omitting higher ranges. In this context,
HECC information will likely be ignored, get an indifferent reception or be ‘unwelcome’
because it runs counter to the ‘2°C remains feasible’ narrative (Rayner and Minns 2015).
A possible explanation for regional differences (Fig. 3b) is that there are different needs and
priorities for adaptation decision-making and for research in these regions and hence the way
people engage is different. Moreover, there might be an information availability and access gap
among regions. For example, model projections of impacts are unlikely to be available
to the same extent and at the same resolution everywhere. Research specifically on
HECC seems to have developed more rapidly in Europe (e.g. Berry et al. 2017;
Capela Lourenço et al. 2019; Harrison et al. 2019b). Differences in access to HECC
information and opportunities to do research will vary. Part of the reason for this
could be lack of funding. The adaptation community does already recognise inequal-
ities through initiatives such as sponsorship for participants from lower-income coun-
tries attending the Adaptation Futures conference.
There is a strong and increasing majority for not waiting for more certain infor-
mation (Fig. 3d). The shift may imply some feeling of urgency around the need for
large-scale adaptation activities.12 Large-scale activities are often equated with gov-
ernment intervention (such as new infrastructure or planning) and/or activities having
long lifetimes (e.g. building irrigation systems or flood protection/barriers). On the
other hand, large-scale adaptations can be autonomous (not explicitly planned) for
example the regreening of the Sahel (Kates et al. 2012). Interventions require higher
budgets compared to ‘softer’ measures such as institutional or behavioural changes,
and might seem riskier (i.e. to risk a waste of resources if climate changes turn out to
be manageable in the long term). However, our result suggests that people consider
the risks of inaction to be higher. Some people might actually consider some large-
scale adaptations to be ‘no-regrets’ strategies. This could particularly be the case if the
activities are synergistic with sustainable development goals. Other studies show that
uncertainty is not generally perceived as a barrier to action (Capela Lourenço et al.
2019) and our result is consistent with this.
6 Conclusions and key policy implications
High-end climate change is becoming increasingly plausible, as emissions continue to rise.
Society is ill-prepared for the specific threats posed by high-end impacts that many in the
adaptation community recognise to be likely to occur. Preparedness must encompass a
combination of strategies. Firstly, it requires strengthening research on impacts of HECC,
particularly through comparative studies of projections, and on the effects of interactions
(including across sectors and across national borders). Impacts research must also include
12 It is also worth remarking that the 2018 conference took place during the Cape Town water crisis, a time of
severe drought, which threatened the water supply at the conference. This first-hand experience of climate risks
might have contributed to a growing sense of urgency for adaptation.
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the appraisal of adaptation responses to HECC. Secondly, more work needs to be done on
improving the applicability of policy support tools—for example by focusing on exploring
policy implications of large changes associated with HECC, and by improving support tools’
design and delivery. Thirdly, there are gaps in understanding adaptation needs in the context of
HECC. These are likely to be considerable—going beyond conventional strategies and
solutions. Efforts must focus on understanding large-scale and transformative solutions and
providing information about effectiveness of these measures under a wider range of scenarios.
Finally, research and tools should be developed in response to these emerging adaptation
needs.
One particular gap we identified was information about decision-making in the context of
HECC. We suggest prioritising decision-making (i.e. adopt ‘decision-first’ approaches) in
future adaptation assessments. Further assessments are needed to reveal differences between
the now relatively well-charted lower end (1.5–2 °C) and HECC scenarios of more than 2 °C,
and this information needs to be available to inform decision-making. Crucially, support for
adaptation decisions requires that both societal drivers, which determine vulnerabilities and the
capacity to cope and adapt, and climate scenarios, which determine changes in temperature and
precipitation and show subsequent impacts, be analysed together. In the current scenario
framework (Van Vuuren et al. 2014), socio-economic and climate change scenarios are
developed in parallel, and then integrated in a subsequent step. Further HECC assessments
should employ a combinatory approach in order to express the full complexity of
scenarios (Carlsen et al. 2017). HECC information also needs to be better contextualised by
representing more relevant scales (i.e. disaggregated resolution) and sectors of action in the
assessments, along with considering regional and institutional factors.
Despite the lack of preparedness for responding to potential challenges of HECC, and the
noted gaps in information, there is an emerging consensus for the need to take action through
large-scale adaptation, without delay. To build on this consensus, those working in this field
will need to improve communication about how the specific needs for adaptation change under
HECC. This is important because large-scale adaptation concerns everyone, and will require
collaboration across a diverse set of actors and sectors for effective implementation. An
important step will be to build awareness of the information available on HECC and the
capacity within key institutions to use this information. Our survey of the use of climate
change knowledge platforms suggests that resources are being invested in platforms that are
ultimately used by very few people. This is unsustainable: either we need to advertise and
promote these knowledge platforms much more actively or we should not develop them at all.
Platforms that work exclusively in an online environment might be far less effective than
alternatives that focus mainly on providing offline training on climate change and adaptation.
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Appendix 1
Table 1 The high-end climate change conference survey
At the COP 21 in Paris world leaders agreed to: ‘Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well
below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above
pre-industrial levels’. However, the legal document does not specify any tools or mechanisms to achieve this
goal. The latest estimates by the UN show that a 2.7–3 °C increase in temperature is likely by the end of the
twenty-first century based on current mitigation efforts. Furthermore, there are other estimates that the
temperature increase can be even higher, possibly up to 4 °C or 5 °C if, for example, the climate system is
more sensitive than was originally thought.
This survey aims to assess current views on high-end climate change, here defined as temperature increase
exceeding 2 °C at the end of the century.
(Please, note the results of this survey will be treated with anonymity).
* Required
1. In my work I am considering climate changes of more than 2 degrees C
All the time We are starting to Occasionally Not at all Other
2. The likelihood of high-end climate change now becoming reality has decreased after the Paris agreement
Strongly
agree




3. I am using high end climate change scenarios for decision-making processes in the context of adaptation/-
mitigation
All the time We are starting to Occasionally Not at all Other
4. It is easy to find information about potential impacts of high-end climate change
Very easy Easy Neither easy nor
difficult
Difficult Very difficult Not relevant to my
work
5. It is easy to find information about decision making with respect to impacts, adaptation and vulnerability in the
context of high-end climate change
Very easy Easy Neither easy nor
difficult
Difficult Very difficult Not relevant to my
work








7. We, as a society, have tools in place to deal with impacts from high-end climate change
Strongly
agree




8. Please indicate your gender (optional):
Male Female
9. Please indicate your age (optional)
20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 > 60
10. Where are you based?*
















12. What is the geographical focus of your entity/interest?* Please tick as many as are relevant
Local Municipal Regional National International
S. Which of the following knowledge platforms do you use in your work? (optional) I have never used this
platform / I use this platform occassionally / I use this platform frequently.Please tick as many as apply
1. UNFCCC Adaptation Knowledge Portal
2. Africa Adapt
3. India Environment Portal
4. ICIMOD




7. The Climate and Development Knowledge Network (CDKN)
8. Adaptation Community
9. Adaptation Learning Mechanism (ALM)
10. Climate Impacts Global and Regional Adaptation Support Platform (ci:grasp)




15. 100 Resilient Cities
16. Info Amazonia
17. AdaptaCLIMA




22. Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre
23. PANORAMA - Solutions for a Healthy Planet
24. The Adaptation Network
25. Pacific Climate Change Portal
2016 2018
0 50 100 150 0 50 100 150
Australasia
Small Islands

















Fig. 4 Number of responses to the surveys a by location and b by organisational affiliation
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